Leveraged Buyouts in Poland by Marcin Piatkowski
TIGER TIGER TIGER TIGER 
T T T TRANSFORMATION, I IIINTEGRATION and G G G GLOBALIZATION E E E ECONOMIC R R R RESEARCH 
CENTRUM BADAWCZE TRANSFORMACJI, INTEGRACJI I GLOBALIZACJI 
 
 
     























Warsaw, June 2001 
 
 
Research Assistant to the Director at T I G E R T I G E R T I G E R T I G E R ￿ Transformation, Integration and Globalization Economic Research at the 
Leon Koźmiński Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management (WSPiZ), ul. Jagiellońska 59, 03-301 Warsaw, Poland. 






Leveraged Buyouts in Poland 
 
Summary 
The dynamic transformation of the Polish economy from a centrally planned to market 
economy is by now well advanced. The transformation has also contributed to a rapid 
development of the capital market. However, the leveraged buyout market has hardly been 
developed yet. 
The leveraged buyout technique allows investors to take companies over with little of 
their own capital. Most of the total value of a transaction is financed with debt, which is 
secured by assets and cash flow of a company being taken over rather than a buyer. 
Companies bought through leveraged buyouts (LBOs) substantially increase their 
return on equity (ROE) thanks to an increase in operating efficiency, higher debt leverage and 
better allocation of assets. In consequence of the substantial improvements in companies￿ 
performance, LBO transactions can yield extraordinary benefits to both existing shareholders 
and LBO investors.  
  A case study of a hypothetical leveraged buyout of a Polish public company listed on 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange highlights the extraordinary returns available to existing 
shareholders as well as buyout investors. The case study also analyzes the whole process of a 
leveraged transaction in order to prove its feasibility in the Polish market. Finally, it 
speculates on the improvements to the company￿s performance in the wake of the leveraged 
buyout. 
Microeconomic improvements at the leveraged firm level translate into large benefits 
to the whole economy. On a macroeconomic level, leveraged buyouts contribute to better 
allocation of capital and higher efficiency of the economy. Leveraged buyouts through 
replacement of equity capital in post-LBO companies with debt, contribute to freeing scarce 
equity capital away from declining, low-value added industries into high-risk, high-value 
added emerging industries, which could not be otherwise financed with debt. 
  Leveraged buyouts can be successfully used in post-socialist countries as a potent tool 
for acceleration of their economic restructuring. Since efficiency of companies in post-
socialist countries as measured by ROE is much lower than in the developed countries, LBOs 
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The dynamic transformation of the Polish economy from a centrally planned to market 
economy in the 1990￿s, initiated by the political breakthrough in 1989, is by now well 
advanced. Most of the economy is in private hands, market prices are driven by the forces of 
supply and demand (versus the central plan as it used to be), internal and foreign trade is 
almost entirely liberalized, and state subsidies were severed long ago. The advanced state of 
the Polish transition has been confirmed by its accession to the OECD in 1996 and 
approaching integration with the European Union, which is expected to materialize by 2005 at 
the latest. 
The transition also had a dramatic impact on the local financial and capital markets. 
From a state of virtual non-existence at the beginning of transformation, today￿s financial and 
capital markets have become vital elements of its market economy. The Polish capital market 
has been rapidly developing since 1990￿s as best embodied by the successful growth of the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. The capital market, although still small by western standards, is 
starting to play as important a role in the economy as it is in the most developed countries.   
However, despite the phenomenal growth of the capital market, it has not yet 
developed all financial instruments and transactions prevalent in the developed markets. 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are one of those transactions, which have hardly been carried out 
so far. The essence of a leveraged buyout comprises in the purchase of assets or shares of a 
company in which a buyer uses debt and external equity as the major means of financing the 
buyout. Debt is incurred against the collateral of assets of the purchased company; the 
company￿s cash flow is used to pay back the debt. The share of total investment provided by a 
buyer of the company usually represents only a small portion of the total financing, which 
never exceeds 50 per cent of the total. After the transaction, the purchased company assumes 
the debt incurred to finance the buyout. 
So far the Polish market has witnessed a very limited number of leveraged 
transactions. Most of them were of very small value or did not exactly comply with the 
definition of a leveraged buyout. Because of a high share of one￿s own capital in the financing 
of the buyout some of the transactions already completed resemble more the traditional buyout 
with major use of one￿s own equity rather than a debt-driven transaction as in leveraged 
buyouts.  
Likewise, paragons of the leveraged buyout market like leveraged buyout funds or 
aggressive individuals buyers (corporate raiders), which in developed markets play the major 
role of initiators of leveraged transactions, have not yet encroached on the virgin Polish 
territory.  
The obvious objective of employing debt leverage in buyout transactions is to increase 
return on investor￿s own investment (ROI). The LBO leverage works ￿ the average return on 
equity in LBO funds in the U.S., which specialize in leveraged buyouts, exceeds 30 per cent 
annually, much higher than most mutual funds or even hedge funds. Yet, leveraged buyouts 
do not only benefit the buyer; they also bring substantial benefits to the company￿s 
shareholders and the economy and the society at large. According to various research (more 
about it later in the paper), companies, which have been bought with the use of debt leverage, 
tend to significantly improve operating efficiency, increase debt leverage and re-allocate non-
core or redundant assets. All this translates into increasing return on the company￿s equity 
(ROE), which directly positively impacts the overall efficiency of the economy.   
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The use of debt in financing the buyout, which is after the LBO assumed by the 
purchased company, allows substitution of existing equity capital with virtually unlimited 
supply of bank financing (by virtue of the mechanism of monetary multiplication). Thus, the 
investor￿s scarce equity can be put to work in those parts of the economy where bank 
financing is unavailable ￿ start-up companies and other high-risk business ventures. The freed 
capital leads to financing of investment projects in emerging industries, thus contributing to 
improvement of the economy￿s efficiency of capital allocation. 
  Leveraged buyouts can bring substantially higher benefits to transition countries than 
to developed countries. Low quality of management, lacking corporate governance, high 
overhead costs, and low productivity all contribute to overall low efficiency measured by 
ROE. All of these shortcomings, which beset still large numbers of state-owned companies as 
well as some private companies in transition economies can be remedied through utilization 
of LBOs. Not less importantly, in light of insufficient supply of local capital for participation 
in privatization of state property, purchase of companies by local investors with the help of 
debt may considerably enhance the speed of the privatization process in the whole economy. 
 
*   *   * 
 
As an introduction to the topic of conditions for emergence of leveraged buyout 
transactions in transition countries and corresponding benefits, this paper will argue that the 
Polish capital market is mature enough for successful completion of leveraged buyout 
transactions, particularly as regards takeover of public companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE). The paper takes Poland as a proxy for the more developed post-socialist 
countries. Yet, to some extent the results for Poland could be valid for the majority of 
transition countries especially in terms of general benefits of LBO transactions to the 
economy.  
The paper will also strive to prove that leveraged buyouts in the Polish market can 
yield significant returns to both incumbent shareholders and LBO investors. It is argued that 
leveraged buyouts represent a very appealing alternative to buyouts with majority share of 
own capital financing.  
Although more research on this topic is needed, the paper argues that leveraged 
buyouts through an increase in operating efficiency, higher leverage, and better allocation of 
assets in the purchased companies may also considerably contribute to the acceleration of the 
restructuring process in Poland and in other post-socialist countries. This in turn would 
increase the macroeconomic efficiency of the whole economy as represented by higher 
productivity, enhanced competitiveness, and better returns on capital. Consequently, leveraged 
buyouts may have a potent contribution to the increase in the rate of economic growth. 
The first part of the paper will paint the general picture of the LBO market, its 
participants, and sources of financing, in both a worldwide and Polish context.  
The second part deals with the LBO process ￿ from structuring the buyout through the 
buyout business plan to exit strategies and legal, tax, and accounting implications.  
The third part presents a step-by-step case study of a leveraged buyout of the Polish 
State Mint (Mennica Panstwowa S.A.), a public company listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE). The paper will highlight potential extraordinary economic viability 
(represented by ROI) of leveraged transactions in Poland for LBO investors. The case study 
will analyze the whole process of LBO buyout in Poland in order to prove the feasibility of the 
transaction. 
The fourth part of the paper will discuss contribution of leveraged buyouts to 
microeconomic efficiency and its implications for overall macroeconomic performance.   
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The concluding part of the paper will summarize the findings of the paper as well as 
elaborate on the prospects for emergence and development of LBO transactions in Poland and, 
per proxy, other transition countries. 
 
 
THE LEVERAGED BUYOUT 
 
Definition 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) represent transactions where a buyer utilizes external 
financing (bank debt, bonds, third party equity) to finance a purchase of a company. Share of 
external financing represents the majority part of the total value of the purchase; buyer￿s own 
capital constitutes the minor portion of the total purchase price. Assets of the purchased 
company along with its cash flow provide collateral and a source of repayment for the 
incurred debt in the transaction
1. In the case of a LBO of a public company, quite often the 
purchased company is delisted from the stockmarket in what is called as ￿taking it private￿. 
Yet, delisting is not necessary. 
 
Transaction rationale 
  The discrepancy in value of a transacted company to a seller and a buyer lie behind the 
obvious rationale for the transaction. Higher value of a company to a buyer creates economic 
incentives to a seller to engage in the sale transaction. But why would the two valuations 
differ? Multiple factors may explain lower valuation of the company for a seller: a need to sell 
the non-strategic company in order to focus on priority business areas, inability to improve the 
performance of the company because of a lack of business acumen in a specific industry, low 
quality of management, lack of credible business plans for future, or finally simple inability or 
unwillingness to structure a leveraged transaction.  
The buyer￿s higher valuation of the company is based on a belief of being capable of 
extracting additional value from the company through an increase in operating efficiency, 
higher debt leverage and better allocation of assets in the purchased company. The 
improvements can be achieved through enhanced ownership control, better quality of 
management conditioned by salary incentive programs, cost cutting, sale of non-core assets, 
utilization of surplus in the company￿s cash holdings (which otherwise might have been used 
to promote ￿empire building￿ with no attention to economic returns), and finally decreased tax 
payments due to the tax shield of interest payments on the debt. 
The discrepancy in the value of a company on both sides will stimulate the transaction 
- the final price in the transaction will be normally found in the middle ground between the 
seller and buyer￿s valuations. 
Although leveraged buyouts can be used as a tool for purchase of companies for 
strategic reasons, the potential for extraordinary returns on capital (ROI) is nonetheless the 
main driver behind the leveraged transactions. For financial investors the large use of debt 
leverage in the buyout transaction (more than 50% of the total value of transaction) 
additionally increases the value of the company. Thanks to leverage, return on own capital 
invested in the company￿s purchase may be significantly higher than when financing the 
purchase only with own capital. 
 
                                                           
1 According to the definition by Stephen C. Diamond, leveraged buyouts are all buyout transactions which 
increase the leverage (defined as total debt to total equity) of the purchased company ￿ Diamond, S.C., ed. 
(1985). ￿Leveraged buyouts￿, Dow Jones Irwin.  
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Market players 
The ranks of buyers in leveraged buyout transactions include strategic and financial 
investors. 
 
Strategic investors are represented by: 
(1) incumbent management (the so-called management buyout ￿ MBO), 
(2) employees (mostly through Employee Share Ownership Programs - ESOP), 
(3) external management (management buy-in ￿ MBI), and  
(4) other corporations.  
Interest of strategic investors in LBOs is driven by strategic considerations aimed at 
expanding business activities, increasing market share, maintaining current managerial and 
work positions, or simply pleasing one￿s ego. An interest in LBOs of purely financial 
investors, which include specialized financial institutions - LBO funds ￿ and individual 
entrepreneurs (called customarily corporate raiders), is stimulated by a potential for significant 
financial reward. Financial investors merely look for sufficient return on their capital invested 
in the transaction ￿ strategic reasons play a minor role, if any.  
Sellers are comprised of three main groups:  
(1) private, family-owned companies willing to share business with new investors or quit 
entirely because of retirement, desire for liquidity or problems with management 
succession;  
(2) corporations, which spin-off their non-core, non-strategic assets, which do not fit the 
business strategy or do not meet criteria on return on equity or market potential;  
(3) and finally shareholders in public companies, which want to sell their stakes in return 
for some premium over the prevailing market stock price. 
Financing for leverage transactions is provided by various financial institutions: 
commercial banks, insurance companies, and pension funds, which usually assume the role of 
secured debt lenders, and venture capital and private equity firms along with investment 
banks, which primarily position themselves as providers of subordinated debt or equity. 
Various sorts of consultants complement the array of different parties in the LBO market. 
Those include investment banks, which help with structuring the financing, legal firms, tax 
firms, PR firms, and specialized advisory firms of various other hues. State and local 















































This paper will be concerned only with the performance of purely financial investors in 
buyouts  - the role of strategic investors in LBO will not be discussed.  
LBO funds and individual corporate raiders represent the core of financial LBO investors. 
The former is specialized investment funds, which focus on leveraged transactions as their 
main investment purpose. LBO funds are managed by LBO firms, which take form of private 
partnerships (like Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts Co.) or limited liability companies (like 
Hicks, Tate and Muse). Investors in the fund, in return for fund management, pay to the LBO 
firm an annual management fee on the total amount of invested money. The fee ranges from 
1.5 to 2.5 per cent
3 and is levied irrelevant of the fact if the money has been invested or not. 
On top of the management fee, the LBO firms usually have a right to a 20 per cent cut on a 
profit made on a leveraged buyout beyond an agreed minimum return of 5 to 8 per cent. 
Additional fees may apply for final sale of the company, extraordinary return and other 
reasons. 
In 1996 and 1997 only American LBO funds received investors￿ money of the total 
amount of USD 70 billion. Applying a usual leverage of 4:1 used in leveraged transaction 
(20% of one￿s equity committed to the buyout), the funds were able to finance LBOs of the 
total value of some USD 280 billion! No wonder that back in the glory days of leveraged 
buyouts in the 1980￿s American LBO funds were able to finance multibillion-dollar takeovers 
like the buyout of RJR Nabisco in 1988 for USD 25 billion. 
                                                           
2 Altered version based on Michel, A. and Schaked, I. (1988). ￿The Complete Guide to a Successful Leveraged 
Buyout￿, Dow Jones-Irwin, p. 179 












LBO funds do not concern themselves with day-to-day management of purchased 
companies. This is left to the management team, which is given strong financial incentives in 
the form of share options in order to insure their optimal performance. LBO funds as purely 
financial outfits focus on structuring the deal: from finding the right target company, agreeing 
to its purchase with the use of debt leverage, through control over post-buyout performance 
and payback of debt, to final sale to another investor within a few years from the original 
purchase (which usually happens within up to 5 years from the buyout). 
The worldwide market sports thousands of LBO funds, yet only the biggest get the 
limelight. A good illustration of the size of the largest funds in this game is a fact that in 1999 
a leveraged fund managed by Thomas H. Lee & Co. took in USD 7 billion of investors￿ 
money; KKR￿s fund received for its transactions some USD 5.7 billion
4. Those significant 
amounts of money, when additionally leveraged, allow LBO funds to set their sights on very 
big companies. 
  
Table 1. Investment in largest LBO funds in 1997 (in USD billion): 
LBO Fund  Investment received 
Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR)  5.8 
Blackstone Group  3.8 
Forstmann Little  3.2 
Thomas H. Lee Company  3.5 
Hicks, Muse, Tate and Furst  3.5 
Texas Pacific Group  2.5 
Total 22.3 
Source: Schiffrin, M. ￿LBO Madness￿, Forbes, March 9, 1998, p. 131 
 
    As opposed to LBO funds, individual investors (called corporate raiders for their 
business aggressiveness) use their own money as seed capital in leveraged transactions. It 
certainly limits their scope of activities (in spite of the leverage). However, it does not limit 
their aggressiveness ￿ no recourse to outside equity investors allows them full liberty with the 
choice of transactions undertaken. Corporate raiders like Carl Icahn or Kirk Kerkorian were 
able to play with huge companies ￿ the former bought TWA Airlines (end of 1980￿s), the 




The spectrum of target companies in leveraged buyouts is very broad, including virtually 
every industry. Since financial profit is often the only consideration behind a company￿s 
buyout, the nature of its business is not a predominant factor in a buyout as long as the 
transaction can bring sufficient return on invested equity. 
An ideal target company would represent the following characteristics: large positive cash 
flow, clean balance sheet with large debt capacity, little or no debt, liquid and undervalued 
assets, excess cash, strong market position, low capital intensity, low-technology product 
lines, abundant possibilities for cost reductions, a strong brand name, and finally a high-
quality management team. In short, ideal target companies should be cash cows, operating in 
no-thrills industries, with little or no debt. 
 
                                                           
4 ￿LBO Madness￿, op.cit., p. 131  
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Financing 
In most LBOs, the buyer￿s own equity does not exceed 20 to 30 per cent of the total value 
of the buyout. The rest of financing is sourced from external sources like venture capital 
funds, bank debt or loans from other financial institutions (mutual funds, investment banks, 
and insurance companies). In some cases of LBO￿s completed in the 1980￿s in the U.S., the 
own equity portion in the total buyout financing hovered close to 5 per cent. In one of the 
leveraged buyouts commissioned by Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts partnership (KKR), the 
investors bought in 1986 a supermarket chain, Safeway, for a total price of USD 4.25 billion, 
of which the equity portion of the buyer amounted to USD 100 million, that is only 2.35 per 
cent of the total value of the transaction! This transaction was then leveraged 43:1!
5 
LBO financing may comprise of up to four layers: 
a)  secured debt collateralized on the company￿s assets and cash flow (hence called ￿secured￿; 
alternatively also called ￿asset based lending￿), 
b) subordinated (unsecured) debt, mezzanine financing ￿ debt and quasi-equity (like 
convertible bonds) subordinated to secured debt in the case of the company￿s bankruptcy. 
In the case of a bankruptcy, holders of subordinated debt would be paid back only after 
holders of secured debt (also called ￿senior debt￿ due to its seniority over other debt 
claims) are fully repaid. 
c)  external investors￿ equity ￿ LBO funds, venture capital, 
d)  investor￿s own equity. 
 
Table 2. LBO financing sources and its structure in American market: 
Type of financing  Per cent in total 
financing 
Source 
Secured debt  5-20%  Commercial banks 
 
Subordinated debt  
(long-term debt, junk 
bonds, convertible 
bonds) 
40-80%  Commercial banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds, investment 
banks 
 
Third-party equity  10-20%  insurance companies, investment 
banks, venture capital funds, LBO 
funds 
Own equity  1-20%  LBO investors 
Source: based on Gaughan, P, (1996).￿Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructuring￿, John 
Wiley & Sons, p.276  
 
Polish LBO financing market 
(a) Secured debt - due to low risk and relative lack of complexity, which plays well 
with the commercial banks￿ risk aversion and relative lack of sophistication in handling high-
risk financing, secured debt lending is by far the easiest to obtain for leveraged buyouts. In 
effect, in most cases secured debt financing in LBO transactions would not differ from regular 
day-to-day commercial banking. Hence, a wealth of bank financing sources is available ￿ 
most of big local and international banks would be likely to finance LBO transaction.  
                                                           
5 ￿LBO Madness￿, op.cit., p. 131   
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This is all the more true since Polish banks are gripped by constant overliquidity. The 
median capital adequacy ratio of Polish banks as of the end of 2000 equaled 14.6 per cent
6, 
which blatantly proves that there is a lot of bank financing available before banks reach the 
minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 per cent. Overliquidity is due to three main factors: (1) 
high interest rates, which on the one hand dissuade borrowing and on the other hand promote 
investment in risk-free government bonds; (2) relative insufficiency of financially sound 
investment projects, which could be financed with debt, and (3) bank￿s risk aversion, which 
often reflects their lack of sophistication in credit risk analysis. Leveraged buyouts could then 
provide a welcome venue for banks to increase their asset base  
Under an assumption that Polish banks would decrease the capital adequacy ratio to 8 
per cent from the current 14.6 per cent, roughly an additional USD 50 billion
7 would be 
available for debt financing (of course, this is a simplified scenario). Some portion of it would 
be also available for LBO transactions. 
Secured funding can also be sourced from a rapidly growing pension fund market. As 
of the end of April 2001, the total assets of the Polish pension funds amounted to some USD 
3.2 billion; the assets are expected to grow by some USD 2.5 billion annually
8. Pension funds 
already play a significant role in the stock market ￿ it was estimated that in April 2001 
pension funds were responsible for 10 per cent of the stockmarket free float
9. With more 
billions to come every year, the stock exchange (total market capitalization as of May 31, 
2001 amounted to PLN 113,112 million or some 16.2 per cent of the Poland￿s GDP in 2000) 
will be more and more unable to cope with growing pension funds￿ investment ￿ the size of 
pension funds will overwhelm the stockmarket.  
In order to find new investment opportunities, pension funds will look for new venues 
for investments ￿ financing leveraged buyouts can be one of them. Pursuant to regulations, 
pension funds can not invest more than 5 per cent of their assets into shares of non-public 
companies ￿ even in spite of this requirement, as of the end of April 2001, pension funds 
could invest up to USD 160 million in buyouts. However, as opposed to non-public shares, 
the maximum threshold for investment into public shares is at 40 per cent of total assets ￿ 
available financing for leveraged buyouts of public companies should be then already counted 
in hundreds of million of dollars. The available pool of financing will rapidly grow ￿ pension 
funds will soon offer billions of dollars ready to finance leveraged transactions! 
Funds of insurance companies complement the pool of low risk, secured financing. 
Polish insurance companies can invest up to 15% of their technical reserve funds into non-
public investments. As of the end of 1998 the available financing hovered around USD 550 
million
10. 
(b) Subordinated, unsecured debt ￿ due to its higher risk profile, subordination in 
repayment, and relatively low sophistication of local banks, the Polish financing market for 
unsecured debt is much less developed than in the case of plain vanilla secured debt. Venture 
capital and equity funds, National Investments Funds (NIFs) along with specialized 
investment banks would be the only likely source of financing. 
Development of the unsecured debt market is, however, supported by a rapid growth 
of bond market. Although most current bond issues are only short-term (tenor of up to 12 
                                                           
6 own calculations for 49 largest Polish banks based on Rzeczpospolita, ￿Banki 2000￿, April 6, 2001. The median of the ten 
largest banks amounted to 13,35%. 
7 Own approximate calculations based on Rzeczpospolita, ￿Banki 2000￿, op.cit. 
8 All PLN/USD calculations are based on an exchange rate of PLN/USD = 4.0. 
9 Rzeczpospolita, May 29, 2001, p. B1, B5. 
10 Based on Wrzesiński, M. (2000). ￿Fuzje i przejęcia. Wykup lewarowany (LBO) i menedżerski (MBO). 
Uwarunkowania rozwoju w Polsce￿, K.E. LIBER s.c., p. 134  
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Figure 2. Polish short- and long-term corporate bond market (in PLN billion): 
Source: based on ￿Rzeczpospolita￿, May 18, 2001, p. B3 
 
The above graph does not take into account long-term issues of bonds of Polish 
companies (currently worth a couple of billion dollars), which were sold in the international 
financial market. Yet, since all of these bonds were issued by blue chip companies like Polish 
Telecoms (Telekomunikacja Polska S.A.) mobile telephone companies (PTC, Polkomtel) or 
Elektrim, this sort of financing would not be available for high-risk leveraged transactions. 
  Foreign financial institutions have not yet shown interest in financing the Polish LBO 
market. This is, however, due to change with the growing importance of the Polish market, 
improving regulatory climate and the positive effects of the integration with the EU, which 
should materialize by 2005. 
  In spite of quick growth of the local bond market, its current size is still very small 
(total value of the local corporate bond market in 2000 corresponds to some 1.7 per cent of 
Poland￿s GDP in 2000). This state of matters is due to low market liquidity, lack of 
institutional bond clearing, and still cumbersome regulations (although significantly improved 
after the enactment in 2000 of the new Bond Law). Prospects for the bond market are 
nonetheless bright ￿ the growing sophistication of market players and increasing competition 
among financial institutions should stimulate further growth of the bond market, high-yield 
bonds (junk bonds) that finance LBOs included. 
  National Investment Funds (NIFs) are a specific feature of the Polish transformation. 
NIFs were created in 1995 to manage 512 companies, whose shares were distributed to the 
Polish public in what was the Polish version of a mass privatization program. In the 
beginning, all fifteen NIFs were assigned majority ownership in some 30-35 companies; the 
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NIFs have significantly restructured their portfolio of companies through sales, mergers, 
consolidations and liquidations. The funds have also consolidated with one another. During 
their seven years of operation, NIFs have transformed into de facto venture capital/private 
equity funds, which actively manage their investment portfolio through not only restructuring 
of their original companies and disinvestments but also through acquisition of companies 
from beyond the original program and financing of start-up ventures.  
  The original mass privatization program had then transformed into a Polish breed of 
venture capital. Although this effect was not the objective of the program planners, its 
implications are very positive ￿ NIFs now constitute a sizeable investment potential, which is 
being utilized to promote high-risk, high-value added projects. This clearly contributes to 
better prospects for economic growth. 
  NIFs are very suitably positioned to engage in LBO transactions both in debt and 
equity financing. As of the end of May 2001, the market value of NIFs, which are all listed on 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange, amounted to PLN 1,497 million. The market value however 
does not correspond to the financial power of NIFs. Under an assumption that NIFs can 
handle financing equal to the book value of their portfolio, which is approximately equal to 
double their market value, the total available financing would hover around PLN 3,000 
million or some USD 750 million. 
(c) Third party equity: possible sources include venture capital/private equity funds, 
NIFs, and investment banks. LBO funds are not included since they do not yet exist in the 
local market. Foreign LBO funds have not so far participated in any local transaction. 
This leaves us with investment banks, NIFs and venture capital/equity funds as main 
potential sources of third-party equity.  
  Local investment banks are quite active in the local M&A market. Yet, the customary 
role of investment banks is to act as a financial intermediary between lenders and debtors. No 
merchant banking activities were developed, which could provide equity for leveraged 
transactions. Coupled with limited capital, the role of investment banks as providers of equity 
is limited. 
  As discussed in point (b), NIFs are well positioned to contribute to the development of 
the LBO market. NIFs are quite likely to be able to extend equity financing ￿ there are no 
major regulatory obstacles to engage in high-risk financing. NIF￿s financing potential of USD 
750 million can be counted as a very likely source of LBO financing. 
  Local venture capital/equity funds represent the second most potent source of equity 
financing for LBOs. These institutions possess both necessary know-how and capital 
necessary to engage in leveraged transactions. The Polish venture capital/private equity 
market is quite well developed ￿ at the end of 2000 the total estimated value of funds 
managed by venture capital firms amounted to more than one billion dollars. 
 
Table 3. Ten largest venture capital funds in Poland in 2000 (in USD million): 
Name  Capital 
invested until 
the end of 1998 
Planned 
investments 





1. Enterprise Investors  371.0  134.0  134..0 
2. The Danish Investment Fund for 
Central and Eastern Europe 
110.0 n.a.  n.a. 
3. Innova Capital/Poland Partners  54.0  160  106.0 
4. Pioneer Investment Poland  40.0  90.0  61.0 
5. Capital International Research  30.0  n.a.  n.a. 
6. International UNP Holdings Ltd  30.0  n.a.  n.a.  
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7. PGF Management  30.0  130.0  n.a. 
8. Oresa Ventures Polska  24.0  50.0  26.0 
9. Renaissance Partners  20.0  n.a.  40.0 
10. Caresbac Polska S.A.  14.8  15.0  16.0 
The rest in aggregate  34.3  156.9  190.2 
TOTAL  758.1 735.9 573.2 
Source: Warsaw Business Journal, ￿Book of Lists 2000￿ , Warsaw 2000, p. 46 
 
Assuming that 20 per cent of combined funds of NIFs and venture capital funds could 
be used for LBOs and applying a 3:1 leverage, the third-equity market could finance leveraged 
transactions of the total value of approx. USD 900 million 
11.  
  
(d) Investors￿ own equity is to be provided by the transaction initiators themselves: 
specialized LBO funds and private individual entrepreneurs. LBO funds do not yet exist in the 
Polish market. They are however likely to be developed by both local financial institutions, 
which in search of increased returns will turn to the LBO market, and foreign LBO funds, 
which will soon enter the growing Polish market in search of investment opportunities. 
  Supply of private individual entrepreneurs ready to engage in LBO transactions will be 
increasing in step with growing available capital of local entrepreneurs (it is estimated the 
personal wealth of the first 100 of the most wealthy Poles amounts to a couple of billion 
dollars), decreasing returns from regular business activities coupled with lower market interest 
rates, and growing sophistication of private investors and their advisors alike. 
 
Cost of financing 
Costs of all sources of LBO financing are directly related to the risk involved. In short, 
as shown in the below graph, the higher the risk, the higher the cost of financing. 
 
 
       
 
    
        
L o w   c o s t          H i g h   c o s t    





The leveraged buyout market, which emerged in the 1970￿s, in the following decade 
became one of the most often utilized methods for purchase of companies, particularly in the 
US. The growth of the LBO market had been galvanized by the flourishing of new financial 
instruments, the famous high yield bonds otherwise known as junk bonds, which in the hands 
of Michael Milken and his investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert provided an abundant 
source for financing risky transactions of LBOs. Furthermore, the dynamic growth of the 
American economy in the 1980￿s provided another potent stimulus for the LBO market ￿ 
companies purchased in leveraged transactions during the economic boom did much better 
and consequently were quickly increasing in value. Finally, high inflation in that period had 
                                                           
11 calculation - (NIF 750.0+ VC 735.9) * 20% * 3 = USD 902 million 





devalued the value of incurred debts, thus the companies were able to pay their debts back 
much faster. In 1987, LBO transactions in total value of M&A transactions represented an 
astonishing 23 per cent
12.  
The beginning of the 1990￿s spelled the end of the LBO boom: the collapse of Michael 
Milken and his bank coupled with an economic recession led to the downturn in the junk bond 
market, the main financing source for LBO, and subsequently, a significant dip in LBO 
activity.  
The end of the 1990￿s in the US witnessed a surge in the leveraged buyout market 
buoyed by economic prosperity, low cost of debt, and overliquidity in the fund market, which 
was scrambling for new investments. Figure 3 provides a handy illustration of the trends in the 
LBO market. 
 
Figure 3. Value of LBO transactions in USA in 1986-1997 (in USD billion): 
Source: Kaiser, K. (1995). ￿Corporate Restructuring and Financial Distress￿, INSEAD, p. 6, and 
￿LBO Madness￿, Forbes, March 9, 1998, p. 129-131 
 
The European LBO market has been much slower to develop. The American example 
and increasing competition for returns among financial institutions in the 1990￿s has 
stimulated sustained growth in the buyout market. The introduction of the EURO, which 
helped in the development of a pan-European source of buyout financing and provided 
necessary price transparency, coupled with regulatory reforms within the EU, has further 
accelerated the LBO growth trend. The leveraged buyout of Telecom Italia by Olivetti in 1999 
for EUR 31.5 billion (interestingly, the market value of Olivetti at the time of transaction was 
six times lower than Telecom Italia￿s ￿ David yet again won against the Goliath!) represents 
one of the most compelling examples of the on-going market development
13.   
  Despite robust growth, the European LBO market still significantly lags behind the US 
market. The value of issued European junk bonds, which usually finance leveraged buyouts 
and therefore can be used as a good proxy for the size of the LBO market, still represent a 
relatively small part of the worldwide market, which is by far dominated by the USA. Figure 4 
presents the relevant data. 
 
 
                                                           
12 Gaughan, P.A., (1996). ￿Mergers, Acqusitions and Corporate Restructuring￿, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
p. 261 




































































Figure 4. Issues of junk bonds in Europe and worldwide between 1993 and IQ of 2000: 
Source: internal data of Schroeder Salomon Smith Barney, an investment bank, based on Bloomberg 
market information. 
 
Polish LBO market 
In light of the fact that no significant LBO transactions have been completed so far in 
the Polish market, one can only speculate about the market potential for leveraged 
transactions. 
The Polish market has not yet developed specialized LBO funds; neither has it 
witnessed an emergence of corporate raiders. This state of affairs is due to a limited 
understanding of the nature of LBO transaction among buyers, sellers and financing parties, 
underdeveloped market for LBO advisors and investment banks, risk aversion of local banks, 
insufficient amounts of available local equity capital, and often unclear legal and tax 
regulations. Lack of precedent-setting leveraged transactions has added to the slow growth of 
the market. 
The Polish market for corporate control, however, has its specific characteristics: (1) 
significant role of State-led privatization, (2) venture-capital-like activity of National 
Investment Funds (NIFs), and (3) on-going heavy restructuring of both State-owned and 
already privatized companies. All these three sources provide abundant supply of target 
companies for leveraged buyouts.  
State-led privatization supplies a significant number of target companies for LBO 
buyouts. Most privatization deals, though, require major contribution of buyers￿ own funds 
(not debt driven), and impose restrictions on reductions in the labor force, sale of assets and 
final re-sale to new investors. Furthermore, buyers have to negotiate separate contracts with 
employees, which often guarantee increases in salaries and bonus payments. Finally, the State 
Treasury also imposes investment obligations on investors ￿ they have to invest additional 
capital into the equity increase of the purchased company. All of these constraints 

































The supply of companies by National Investment Funds (NIFs) has, however, much 
fewer strings attached. Since the beginning of the mass privatization program in 1995, NIFs 
have been energetically restructuring their portfolios of companies. This was done through 
mergers, acquisitions, public IPOs, and sales to strategic investors or liquidations. Out of the 
original 512 companies, almost half has already been sold or liquidated. This process has in its 
wake produced a steady stream of target companies for buyouts. However, leveraged buyouts 
have not been utilized yet in any of those transactions.  
Still there are more than 300 companies to be sold. In recent years the activity of NIFs 
evolved from an active operating management of portfolio companies to pure venture-capital 
investment. This evolution has had an impact on the NIFs approach to selling their companies 
through leveraged transactions. Coupled with the funds￿ growing finanical sophistication, 
prospects for leveraged buyouts of NIF￿s companies are very attractive. It is only a matter of 
time when first big transaction will be concluded. 
State-owned and already privatized companies are now undergoing a process of very 
deep restructuring. Market liberalization, the lifting of trade barriers, and growing market 
power of foreign companies, have led to rising competition in the local market. In order to 
survive, uncompetitive State-owned companies had to downsize their operations and focus on 
core competencies. Former sprawling conglomerates like Elektrim, Rolimpex, Animex or 
Mostostal Export, that before, in spite of their partial privatization, were unable to restructure 
themselves, finally had to abandon ￿empire building￿ strategies and engage in a reversal 
process of disinvestment. For example, Elektrim, which in the mid-1990￿s possessed control 
over almost one hundred companies (involved in as varying activities as power generation and 
yogurt making) at the end of the 1990￿s had to unwind its empire and focus on its core 
business of telecommunication, power generation and cables. 
The process of downsizing and disinvestment has still a long way to go. Many non-
core companies are waiting for their buyers. Scarce amounts of available local capital and 
often lack of interest from foreign strategic investors creates great potential for leveraged 
transactions. 
Privatization is also producing in its wake a steady offer of companies for sale. 
Strategic investors, that buy the major part of the privatized companies, quickly rearrange the 
companies￿ activity away from non-core businesses to core competencies. As with the State-
owned companies, these restructuring efforts result in increasing the supply of companies 
available for sale. Growing unemployment from approximately 10 per cent in 1997 to current 
16 per cent that occurred in spite of positive GDP growth bears proof to the magnitude of the 
restructuring efforts. 
All the three sources of supply of target companies for LBO should stimulate the 
growth of the leveraged buyout market. The growing sophistication of local financial and 
advisory institutions will provide further boost to the market￿s development. Mounting 
competitive pressure on commercial banks, investment banks and consulting firms, should 
result in moving away from plain vanilla, low margin debt financing (straight loans, bond 
issues) and less complex consulting services into higher value-added and riskier transactions 
of leveraged financing and advisory. This will provide additional stimulus for the LBO 
market.   
An increasing number of completed takeovers of public companies listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange, confirms the growing sophistication of the Polish capital market. 
Local entrepreneurs had successfully taken over a number of public companies
14. Although 
                                                           
14 Some examples: takeover of Paged S.A., a wood manufacturer and distributor, by Yawal S.A., a metal 
manufacturing company; purchase of Wistil S.A., a textile company by an individual investor ￿ Zenona 
Kwiecień, assumption of control over Ferrum S.A., a steel processor, and Energomontaz Polnoc S.A., a power  
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the size of the completed transactions is still small, and one￿s own equity is the predominant 
source of financing, leveraged transactions are only one step ahead. 
The Polish capital market developed in the 1990￿s a peculiar type of the buyout market 
￿ employee leasing buyout. Enacted in the early 1990￿s as one of the instruments of 
privatization, the employee leasing buyout may be interpreted as a close type of transaction to 
a leveraged buyout. In an employee leasing buyout, employees of a company could buy their 
company from the state on installments payable within up to ten years. The financing would 
be incurred against the assets of a company, not by the employees, which would supply funds 
for at least 20 per cent of the total price (just like in leveraged buyouts). Employees would 
take a complete control over the company. However, since up until the final payment of the 
last installment the state remains the legal owner of the company and thus may decide over the 
final fate of the company, the employee leasing buyout does not qualify as a leveraged buyout. 
Nevertheless, employee leasing buyouts have laid the foundation for the emergence of the real 
leveraged market. 
 
THE LBO PROCESS 
Structuring the transaction 
As said before, assets of the purchased company along with its cash flow provide the 
collateral for the debt financing of the buyout. Thanks to the contribution from the external 
financing, the buyout may be completed with only a small portion of the investor￿s own 
equity. Collaterlization of the debt on the assets of the target company also substantially 
decreases the risk of the transaction for the buyer ￿ should anything go wrong, lenders would 
have to rely on the target company￿s assets only, rather than those of the investor. 
There are two main structures of the leveraged buyout depending on what is bought: 
(1) assets of the company or (2) its shares. In both cases, the economic result is the same: the 
investor assumes control over the company. Yet, financial, tax, accounting and legal 
implications may largely differ depending on the chosen transaction structure. Why would 
then one buy assets instead of shares or vice versa? 
 
Asset purchase 
The leveraged buyout of the company based on the purchase of its assets offers some 
benefits versus the purchase of the company￿s shares. In short, the purchase of assets 
considerably limits the legal risk associated with the buyout ￿ the buyer assumes the 
liabilities, which are directly related to the assets being bought. Almost none of the remaining 
liabilities of a target company are conveyed. Hence, the buyer is not liable for any of the 
selling corporation’s undisclosed or unknown liabilities (￿skeletons in the cupboard￿). Thanks 
to clear identification of the assets being purchased, lenders can secure themselves on 
identifiable pieces of assets rather than the total company￿s property including both assets and 
liabilities. Consequently, the purchase of assets allows easier access to secured debt financing. 
 
Share purchase 
The purchase of shares rather than assets can be accomplished much faster. In 
addition, the purchase of shares allows automatic and complete takeover of all assets of the 
company, including those, which due to their nature are not transferable and can not be sold 
(contracts, administrative permits, licenses etc.). Those advantages are mitigated by the higher 
risk of buying a company with potential unreported liabilities (￿skeletons￿), and the higher 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
plant subcontractor, by private company ￿Collosseum￿; buyout of Krosno S.A., a glass manufacturer, by 
Zbigniew Sawicki.  
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cost of debt financing due to less clearly identifiable debt collateral (for more on legal aspects 
see the ￿Legal, tax, and accounting aspects￿ section of the paper). 
Despite some disadvantages, the purchase of shares is the most widely used structure 
for leveraged buyouts, particularly takeovers of public companies quoted on stockmarkets. 
Buyout of a company based on a purchase of shares may be structured in multiple ways. The 
quality of credit collateral remains the cardinal factor in the choice of the buyout structure. For 
the lenders, there are two important conditions for extension of financing: (1) the enforcement 
and validity of provided collateral (direct or indirect collateral on target company￿s assets), 
and (2) the particular moment when debt is collaterialized on the assets of the target company 
(the sooner, the better). Too low credit quality of collateral may dissuade lenders from 
financing the buyout and consequently bring about the collapse of the transaction.  
Each of the below presented buyout structures, that have been successfully utilized in 
the US, present different ways of securing lenders￿ credit approval
15: 
 
1.  Lenders extend unsecured credit to a holding company (step 1), that enters into purchase 
agreement with a seller. With borrowed money, the holding company buys shares from 
current shareholders of the target company (step 2).  Immediately after the purchase, 
lenders yet again extend credit, this time directly to the target-company (step 3). The target 
company through dividend payouts or extension of inter-company loan, transfers the 
financing to the holding company (4), which then pays back its lenders (5). The debt of the 
















2.  After the signing of the purchase agreement between a holding company and a seller, the 
holding company pays for the company￿s shares with a promissory note payable at a 
specified future time (1). After the purchase, lenders extend credit to the target company, 
its assets serving as loan collateral (2). The target company in turn funnels back the 
financing to the holding company through an inter-company loan or dividend payout (3). 




        
 
                                                           























3.  The structure of a cash merger consists in merging a special purpose vehicle company 
(SPV) with a target company (1). The merged entity normally retains the target company￿s 
name. After the merger, the target company proceeds with conversion of its shares into 
financial liabilities due to current shareholders Subsequently, lenders finance the target 
company against collateral of its assets and cash flow (2). The received financing is then 
used to pay back liabilities towards shareholders (3). In the final stage, the target company 
















Due to legal and tax issues, this buyout structure is most often utilized in the US in buyouts of 
publicly listed companies. 
 
4.  Public tender ￿ a shell company announces a tender offer for shares of a target company 
(1). Pursuant to the tender announcement, a shell company obliges itself to buy shares at 
some specified price subject to two conditions: 
a)  Purchase in the tender of at least 80% of company￿s shares, and 
b)  Successful merger with the target company after the tender offer 
Should any of these two conditions not be met, the tender offer is annulled. The additional 
condition may allow buyers to vote for the merger even before the final payment for the 
purchased shares in the tender. This structure allows assumption of complete control over the 
target company without a need for the purchase of 100% of outstanding shares (1). This 
solution also limits risk for lenders, who would finance the purchase of shares only after the 
consummation of the merger with the target company (2). Assumed debt is used to buy back 
shares from current shareholders (3). 
 
 

































All of the above buyout structures limit financing risk for lenders since the credit is extended 
directly to the target company and thus it is collateralized on its assets and cash flow. 
 
5.  The last of the presented structures presents a situation in which lenders first extend 
unsecured credit to a SPV (1). The loan is then used to finance the purchase of shares of 
the target company (2). After the purchase, the SPV merges with the target company (3). 














Leveraged buyout structures in the Polish market 
Local legal and tax regulations will have a predominant impact on the feasibility of the 
above outlined buyout structures.  
In buyouts, that entail the merger of a shell company with a target company, the issue 
of the protection of rights of the target company￿s minority shareholders presents a significant 
risk to success of the transaction. With a view to protecting rights of small shareholders, the 
brand new Commercial Code,  which came into force in January 2001, endows small 
shareholders with quite powerful rights of contesting the company￿s mergers with other 
entities. Those rights when utilized may become a serious hurdle on the way to the merger. 
Although contesting the merger may finally prove unsuccessful, the opposition of small 
shareholders may significantly delay the whole transaction. In the instance of a planned 
merger of two Polish banks, BRE S.A and Bank Handlowy S.A. as well as an attempted 
takeover of BIG Bank Gdański S.A. by Deutsche Bank, the opposition of small shareholders 
resulted in a collapse of both merger projects. It is very important to mention, though, that 
both transactions were attempted during the rule of the old Commercial Code ￿ the new Code, 
although less favorable for small shareholders, nonetheless did not change minority rights vis-
a-vis mergers in any tangible manner.   
Furthermore, due to often unclear tax regulations concerning merger and acquisition 


















buyout￿s prospects. Finally, merger transactions require a seal of approval from the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Office (Polish State anti-monopoly authority), which 
may decide to oppose the merger on the grounds of the prevention of monopoly powers or 
￿important interests of the State￿.  
Hence, in order to steer clear of problems with merger-driven buyout transactions, the 
preferred buyout structure in the Polish market does not entail any mergers. For that reason, 
structure 1 and 2 outlined above, should represent the most preferred solution. In addition to 
lack of merger risk, in both structures lenders￿ financing is being extended directly to the 
target company. This fact, while decreasing the credit risk, allows for easier and cheaper 
access to financing. Also from the tax point of view, structure 1 and 2 is much less risky than 
merger buyouts since inter-company financing involved in this structure resembles a regular 
loan agreement (important to note that inter-company bond financing as opposed to straight 
loan financing is not subject to a stamp duty of 2 per cent). 
  
Business plan of LBO 
Having structured the transaction, the business plan for the leveraged takeover is the next 
important part of the deal. The business plan of a buyout has three dominant objectives: (1) 
prove that the transaction will bring sufficient return on invested capital to the buyer, (2) 
assure lenders of the credit risk feasibility of the buyout (prove target￿s company ability to 
service debt), and (3) present a detailed strategy of the takeover from the purchase financing to 
the exit along with tools for performance monitoring. 
The LBO business plan would normally comprise the following elements: 
a)  Executive summary of the transaction, 
b)  Information memorandum on the target company, 
c)  Valuation of the target company, 
d)  Financing of the purchase, 
e)  Exit strategies (ways of selling back the purchased company), 
f)  Calculations of investor￿s ROI for different scenarios, 
g)  Analysis of tax, legal and accounting aspects. 
 
Post-LBO process 
What happens to the company after it has been taken over in a leveraged buyout 
transaction? In most cases, the new owners aim to exit the investment in the company within 
the 3-5 year period. The exit may be performed through sale of the company to strategic 
investor, its flotation on the stock exchange through initial public offering (if the company 
was private), liquidation or significant curtailment of the company￿s activities and sale of its 
assets (a strategy known as asset-stripping). During the 3 to 5 year period, new owners 
restructure the company, pay back the debt incurred by the company in the buyout, and sale 
redundant assets in order to amass liquid cash for debt prepayment. 
 
Return on investment  
Thanks to the use of debt leverage, returns on invested equity (ROI) in LBO transactions 
may indeed by significant. In the U.S. market, ROI of leading LBO funds exceeds 30 per cent 
per annum. The mechanism of the leverage is quite obvious: let￿s assume that an investor 
purchases a company and subsequently sells it at a price 20 per cent higher. Now, if the 
purchase is in 100 per cent financed with own money, the ROI on the transaction is still 20 per 
cent; however, if the buyer puts up only one fourth of the total value of the purchase, whereas  
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the rest is financed with debt, then the total ROI for the buyer would not be 20 per cent only 
but a whopping 80 per cent!
16 
 
Legal, tax and accounting aspects 
Selection of the most suitable legal, tax and accounting structure of the LBO has great 
impact on the final results of the transaction. The chosen type of legal structure, sequence of 
buyout actions or takeover strategy may have decidedly different implications for the 
feasibility of the buyout. 
 
(1) Legal aspects 
There is a whole wealth of legal issues concerning the leveraged buyouts. Yet, they are 
not the focus of this paper. Hence, only some most seminal legal aspects of the LBO will be 
highlighted. Other aspects of the buyouts can be then studied in relevant bibliography (see 
also this paper￿s bibliography for reference). 
Insufficient regard to legal implications may easily endanger the feasibility of the 
buyout and thwart its expected economic benefits. Moreover, breach of the buyout governing 
law may even result in criminal prosecution. 
Takeover of a company may take different forms.
17 Yet, as already mentioned 
in the ￿Structuring the transaction￿, purchase of assets or shares of a target company represent 
the two main buyout scenarios. These two forms have considerably different legal 
implications for the buyer. 
 
Asset purchase 
The leveraged buyout of the company based on the purchase of its assets offers some 
benefits versus the purchase of the company￿s shares. First of all, purchase of assets only 
limits the legal risk associated with the buyout ￿ the buyer assumes only liabilities, which are 
specified in the purchase agreement and directly related to the assets being bought. Hence, 
except for accounts payable, none of other liabilities are conveyed. The buyer may thus avoid 
the possibility of becoming liable for any of the selling corporation’s undisclosed or unknown 
liabilities (like environmental and employee claims, income taxes, lawsuits, contract 
liabilities, and other possible ￿skeletons in the cupboard￿). Secondly, purchase of assets 
allows easier access to secured debt financing ￿ lenders can secure themselves on identifiable 
pieces of assets rather than total company￿s property, which includes both assets and 
liabilities. The enhanced credit security for lenders results in higher amounts of available 
financing, better financing terms and lower debt covenants as compared to financing based on 
the company￿s total property.  
Purchase of assets, however, also has disadvantages ￿ high costs of asset evaluations 
(independent appraisals of building, equipment etc.), complex documentation and consequent 
time delays. In addition, purchase of assets only rather than shares means that the buyer may 
not be able to take advantage of existing contracts, patents, administrative permits, quality 
marks, licenses, and other more or less tangible assets of the company, that due to their nature 
can not be sold and therefore have to remain with the selling company. 
Buyout of the company through purchase of its assets is normally conducted by a 
special purpose vehicle, a SPV, which is brought into the transaction by the ultimate buyer, 
which in turn is represented by a holding company. The introduction of the SPV in the buyout 
further limits the liabilities of the ultimate buyer. 
                                                           
16 For sake of simplicity the cost of debt has been ignored. 
17 for full analysis see Frąckowiak, W. (1998). ￿Fuzje i przejęcia przedsiębiorstw￿, Polskie Wydawnictwo 
Ekonomiczne, Warszawa, p. 99.  
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Therefore, the usual process of asset purchase would entail the following succession of 
steps:
18 incorporation of a shell company, signing of the asset purchase agreement, that would 
detail price, payment conditions, evaluation of purchased assets and enumeration of liabilities, 
advance payment for purchased assets by the holding company, which then are being 
transferred as an asset input to the SPV, subsequently becoming the owner of the assets. This 
fact allows lenders to step in and disburse financing to the shell against the collateral of its 
newly acquired assets. In a final step, the SPV pays back the holding company, which then 
pays the remaining portion of the asset purchase price. In consequence of this process, the 
target company￿s assets are transferred to the SPV, the new sole owner. After the transaction, 
since cash represents most of its assets from the sale, the target company becomes a cash 




Buyout of the company through the purchase of its shares can be done much faster 
than in the asset purchase scenario. Furthermore, purchase of shares allows automatic and 
complete takeover of all assets of the company, including those, which due to their nature are 
not transferable and can not be sold (as mentioned above, these include contracts, 
administrative permits, licenses etc.).  
Disadvantages of share-based buyouts are a mirror reflection of benefits of asset-based 
transactions ￿ there is a risk of finding unreported liabilities (￿skeletons￿) and higher cost of 
debt financing. Providing for the buyer￿s indemnification and the right to offset future 
payments due to the seller can minimize the risk of inheriting undisclosed debts of the seller 
in a share transaction. 
  
(2) Tax aspects 
We will pinpoint some main points on the tax implications of leveraged buyouts: 
(a) The main tax rule says that all income generated from sale or purchase of shares is 
not taxed until the receipt of cash. Because of that rule, sellers in LBO transactions have an 
incentive to postpone the moment of the cash receipt. This may be achieved through receipt of 
other than cash sources of value ￿ shares, debt instruments, and other assets. Only the final 
sale of those assets for cash will result in tax liability. 
(b) In most countries all purchase and sale transactions (including shares) are 
taxed with a stamp duty. In the Polish tax code the stamp duty amounts to 2% of the total 
value of transaction. Shares of public companies listed on the stockmarket are however 
exempted from the stamp duty. 
(c) Loss carry forwards ￿ ability to take advantage of the accumulated losses of a target 
company to offset income of the merged companies in a buyout may represent a very 
significant source of value for the LBO investors.  
 
(3) Accounting aspects 
Accounting for LBO takeovers will be conditioned by the chosen LBO structure: either 
(a) involving the merger of a SPV with a target company or (b) not. 
  In the first scenario, where the merger is a part of the buyout strategy, the purchasing 
company has to choose between the two accounting methods for mergers: (a) pooling of 
interest method and (b) acquisition method. 
                                                           
18 altered version based on Michel, A. and Shaked, I. (1988). ￿The complete guide to a successful leveraged 
buyout￿, Dow Jones-Irwin, page 252.  
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  The pooling of interest method is more attractive for merging companies since the 
balance sheets of both merging companies are being added to each other at their book rather 
than market values. Consequently, goodwill is not accounted for, which otherwise would have 
to be amortized against the net income of the merged companies. From the cash flow point of 
view, the amortization of goodwill does not mean anything - it is purely an accounting 
standard with no repercussions for cash generation (amortization of goodwill is not tax 
deductible). Amortization of goodwill decreases the accounting net income, but not the cash. 
  In the acquisition method of accounting for mergers, the two companies have to merge 
on the basis of the market value of the balance sheets. If the price paid for the merging 
company (in cash or in shares) differs from the market value of assets of the merging 
company, one has to account for goodwill (or capital reserve if the price paid is less than the 
market value). Acquisition method is then, at least from an accounting point of view, a less 
attractive option than the pooling of interest method ￿ in acquisition the net income of the 
merged companies will be lower than in the pooling method. 
  Not surprisingly then, investors want to use the pooling of interest method for mergers 
in order to show better net income. However, the accounting conditions for using the pooling 
method are quite stringent - most mergers do not qualify and have to be accounted for under 
the acquisition method. 
  Yet again though, from LBO investors￿ point of view, both accounting methods are 
quite irrelevant ￿ from an economic point of view, that mostly looks at the cash generation, 
both methods are the same. Focus of LBO investors is entirely centered on the cash generation 
rather than accounting income. The success of a buyout is not judged on the basis of the net 
income of purchased companies ￿ it is purely judged on their cash performance. 
In the second scenario, where the merger is not consummated, accounting implications 
will depend on the apparent objective of the transaction: either (a) purchase of a company with 
an intention to re-sell it or (b) long-term investment. In the former situation, investment in 
shares of a target company in the balance sheet of the buyer will appear as short-term 
investment. 
In the latter situation, where buyers arbitrarily decide that they would regard purchase 
of shares as a long-term investment, accounting implications are much more complex. If LBO 
investors buy more than 10% of total shares of a target company, they will have to prepare a 
consolidated balance sheet report for both the buying and purchased company. In addition, if 
share purchase price exceeds market value of the assets of a target company, the dominating 
company (SPV) is bound to account for generated goodwill or capital reserve. These are then 
gradually amortized against income in the next years
19. 
 
A CASE STUDY 
 
For the purpose of the case study, the paper will analyze the potential leveraged buyout 
of Mennica Państwowa S.A. (Polish State Mint Plc, ￿Mint￿, www.mennica.com.pl) a public 
company based in Warsaw, listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE at www.wse.com.pl). 
The company engages in minting production (coins, medals, decorations, seals, date markers), 
precious metal processing (gold, platinum, palladium, iridium, rhodium) for the needs of 
optics and electronics, and production of gold and platinum paints for glass and porcelain 
decoration.  
                                                           
19 For more information of merger and acquisition accounting see Helin, A. and Zorde, K. (1998). ￿Fuzje i 
przejęcia￿, Fundacja Rozwoju Rachunkowości w Polsce, p.193-240.  
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The choice of the Mint for the case study was based on its almost perfect suitability for 
leveraged buyout, as illustrated by the following characteristics: 
a)   undervalution 
 
Table 4. Stockmarket ratios of Mennica based on share price as of 31.05.2001: 
  Mennica 
Price/Earnings 5.9 
Price/Book Value  0.78 
Source: quotes based on ￿Rzeczpospolita￿, June 1, 2001. 
 
The valuation of the company based on the discounted cash flow method (DCF) returns a 
value of PLN 414,000 thousand, this is 135% more than the current market capitalization of 
PLN 175,800 thousand
20. 
b)   large cash flow generation 
 
Table 5. Mint￿s operating cash flow 1998-2000 (in PLN thousand): 
  1998  1999  2000 
Operating cash flow  13,550  53,742  30,128 
Source: the company￿s annual reports
21 
 
c)   large holdings of cash and marketable securities of PLN 19,309 thousand as of the end 
of 2000 
d)   low leverage - as of December 31, 2000, the company￿s total leverage (total debt to 
equity) amounted to 24%; bank debt-to-equity ratio was, however, much lower and 
amounted to only 18.2%. 
e)   shareholding structure ￿ no shareholder with majority ownership. 
e)   established market position ￿ the Mint is almost a complete monopolist in its main 
activity: production of coins, metal badges, and numismatic accessories. The company 
is the only supplier of coins to the National Bank of Poland.  
f)  significant value of assets - fixed capital investments in the last four years amounted to 
roughly PLN 120 million; in the same period, the company in addition spent PLN 36 
million on long term financial investments. Finally, last year the company completed 
construction of a new business office center, at a total cost of some PLN 60 million. In 
aggregate, Mint has recently spent PLN 216 million, alone 23% more than the current 
market capitalization! 
g)   sale of assets - most of the recent investment, both fixed and financial, could be sold at 
prices close to their book values (depreciation in fixed assets would be 
counterbalanced by increase in value of long-term financial investments and the real 
estate project). In addition to that, the company could relocate its production away 
from Warsaw￿s downtown to suburbs. This would allow a sale of the existing office 
centers and land worth an additional PLN 70 million. All in all, the sale of the 
company￿s assets might bring some PLN 286 million of gross revenue, that is 63.4% 
more than the current market capitalization. 
g)  stable and mature technology - the minting production is in a very mature 
technological stage ￿ no major technology upgrades are required. For that reason, the 
                                                           
20 for all calculations in USD the exchange rate of  PLN/USD = 4.0 has been used. 
21 all data unless otherwise stated is based on Mint￿s financial reports.  
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company in recent years has been able to funnel generated cash flow into real estate 
projects rather than technology investments.  
h)  stable and experienced management - most of the incumbent management has spent, 
on average, thirteen years with the company. 







The structure of the leveraged buyout 
 








   
  





1. Financing   
We will assume that the buyer￿s own equity will represent 30% of the total value of the 
transaction. The balance will be financed with a bridge loan, tenor of up to 12 months, secured 
on all purchased shares of Mint. The 30% share of the investor will limit the risk for lenders 
of the collapse in Mint￿s share price.  
2. Permissions 
The buyer needs to obtain permissions for purchase of 50% of total shares of the Mint 
from the anti-monopoly office
22 (￿UOKiK, http://www.uokik.gov.pl/) and the Securities 
Commission (￿KPW￿). Purchase of Mint by a special purpose vehicle (SPV), not by 
competing corporations, does not endanger the market competition. For KPW ￿important 
interests of the State or the country￿
23 should not prevent it from issuing permission. In the 
last three years both institutions have accepted all applications for purchase of shares of 
stockmarket companies. This should also be the case in a takeover of Mint. 
3. Public  tender 
The buyercalls a public tender for 50% of outstanding shares of Mint at a price of PLN 
39.0, a 30% premium over prevailing share price. The total value of the tender would amount 
to PLN 130,650 thousand. Investor￿s total capital invested would amount to PLN 43,500 
thousand, one-third of the total. The tender offer for more than 50% of shares of Mint would 
                                                           
22 UOKiK competences are regulated by a Anti-monopoly Bill enacted on 24.02.1990. 









require announcement of an offer for all outstanding shares, which would significantly 
increase the value of the transaction. It does not have to be done, though ￿ 50% of shares will 
be sufficient to assume a complete control over the company. 
The offered 30% premium over the prevailing share price is very likely to assure 
shareholders￿ response to the tender offer (out of 79 tender offers in Poland announced in the 
period of 1998 through the first half of 2000, premium in 55 tenders hovered between 0% and 








4.  Assumption of control 
After completion of the tender offer resulting in a purchase of 50% of outstanding shares 
of Mint the buyer will ask the Management Board to summon the Extraordinary Meeting of 
Shareholders
26. During the meeting, the buyer will assume control over the Supervisory Board 
of the company.  
5.  Extension of a subordinated loan to SPV 
At the behest of the Supervisory Board, the company￿s management will incur a loan 
from external lenders of the value equal to the value of the bridge financing incurred by the 
SPV (with low leverage, large cash flow generation and unencumbered assets the company 
would have no problems with securing financing  - see Appendix 1). The new debt will be 
used to extend long-term loan to the SPV (it could be, for instance, market priced long-term 
zero-coupon bonds, which pay no interest until final repayment).  
6.  Repayment of bridge financing 
                                                           
24 M. Lewandowski ￿Przejęcia i fuzje w Polsce na tle tendencji światowych￿, WIG Press 2001, p. 33 
25 Multico Ltd. is a private company; BIG BG, a bank, maintains shares on behalf of the Mint management (this is a part of a 
management incentive program). In reality then, BIG BG￿s shares belong to Mint￿s management. 
There are no priviliged shares ￿ all shares give a right to one vote. In the total shareholdings we have also included the issue 
of new shares in exchange for convertible bonds in the value of PLN 25 million. The conversion will take place in June 2001. 
26 According to the Commercial Code, shareholders with at least 10% of the total share capital are authorized to call the 













In the final step, the SPV pays back the full amount of the outstanding bridge financing. 
With the repayment of the bridge loan, the SPV assumes full control over Mint; its long-term 
debt towards Mint is payable in some specified future (5 years or more).  
7. Merger 
Optionally, Mint may decide to merge with the SPV. This would solve the question of the 
payment of the long-term loan (it would become Mint￿s liability). Yet, as mentioned before, 
mergers can quite easily by contested by remaining shareholders. In addition, decisions on the 
merger have to be taken by at least 75% of the present shareholders at the Meeting of 
Shareholders (Commercial Code). Hence, the merger option may not be the most attractive. 
Otherwise, the loan may be repaid only at the time of a sale of the stake in the Mint by the 
SPV. Alternatively, the loan can be paid back in installments with the Mint￿s dividend 
payouts. 
 
Valuation of Mint 
The valuation of the Mint was calculated on the basis of three methods:  
(1) Net asset value,  
(2) Simplified valuation based on the company￿s ability to service debt, and  
(3) Discounted Cash Flow method (DCF).  
 




Table 6. Value of Mint for various valuation methods: 
  Book value  Simplified  DCF 
Total value  215,446  693,390  414,000 
Total value to current 
market value 
122.5% 394.4%  235.4% 
 
Financing of the buyout 
The total value of the buyout at a 30% premium will equal PLN 130,650 thousand 
(half of the total value of the company since only 50% is purchased). At one-third of own 
capital in the total financing, the needed amount of debt amounts to PLN 87,100 thousand. As 
shown in Appendix 1, the company has an ability to service even larger debt. The bridge 
financing would be available from a wide variety of financial institutions, from commercial 
banks, insurance companies, and investment banks to venture capital firms. 
 
Legal, tax and accounting aspects: 
Successful tender offer for 50% of shares will have the following implications:  
a)  legal ￿  SPV will become a controlling entity for Mint. SPV will be liable for all 
liabilities of Mint up to the value of its investment in the company (limited liability 
then). 
b)  tax ￿ no tax payable until sale of purchased shares. At the moment of sale of shares for 
cash or other assets, the positive difference between the value of cash or assets and the 
cost of purchased shares of Mint (together with all ancillary costs) will represent a 
taxable income for the SPV. 
c)  accounting ￿ depending on the short- or long-term character of the investment in Mint, 
investment in Mint￿s shares will either be displayed in the SPV￿s balance sheet as 
                                                           
27 All calculations in Appendix 2  
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short-term or long-term financial investment. In the latter scenario, financial results of 
Mint will be consolidated with that of the SPV. 
 
Exit strategies 
The LBO buyer may choose to exit the investment in Mint in the following ways: 
(a) Sale to strategic investor, 
(b) Public offering of shares, 
(c) Management buyout by existing management, 
(d) Dividend payouts, 
(e) Share buybacks by the company, 
(f) Liquidation. 
 
Return on Investment (ROI) in the LBO of Mint 
Assuming that the Mint could be sold to new investors within a year from its purchase 
and at the sale price equal to its DCF valuation, the return on invested capital for the buyer 
(ROI) for various discount rates would be the following (calculations in Appendix 3): 
 
Figure 7. ROI in LBO of Mint for various discount rates: 
 
 
Conclusions: At the 14,2% real discount rate, the leveraged buyout of the Mint would 
have yielded a ROI of 117% per annum! Even for a 20% discount rate, the buyout of 
the Mint would return ROI of 34%, which highlights the extreme attractiveness of this 
investment opportunity
28. 
                                                           
28 The ROI calculations were based on very conservative assumptions. The final ROI could be much higher due to the 
following reasons: 
a)  There is a high likelihood for the sale of attractive real estate assets at a price higher than their book values, 
b)  Lower discount rate could be applied to the DCF valuation due to an expected decrease in Polish interest rates, which 
are now exorbitatnly high (some 14% in real terms!) and lower risk premium for the Polish stockmarket (much less than 













ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 
 
Leveraged buyouts improve performance of companies owing to three effects: 
1.  Higher operating efficiency due to: 
a) reduction in agency costs (conflicts of interests between management and 
shareholders) due to closer control of shareholders over the management, 
b)  higher commitment of management due to salary incentive programs focused on the 
performance of a company rather than its size (share options etc.) 
c)  disciplinary impact of the debt burden, which prompts the management to conserve 
cash and pursue investment projects with undoubted positive returns (NPV) 
2.  More efficient financial structure with higher debt leverage, which, while decreasing the 
overall cost of a company￿s capital, increases a company￿s ROE. Tax deduction of debt 
interests (tax shield) decreases tax payments and consequently results in larger free cash 
flow, which is an another source of value for shareholders.  
3.  Better allocation of assets achieved through the sale of non-core or redundant assets and 
rigorous assessment of all investment projects aimed at selection of the investment 
projects with high net present values. 
 
The improved performance of leveraged companies brings benefits both on a micro 
(shareholders and investors) as well as on a macroeconomic level of the whole economy.  
On the microlevel, substantial premiums paid to shareholders in buyout transactions 
increase the shareholders￿ wealth, thus positively impacting the well being of the society. 
Wealthier shareholders are likely to save more ￿ additional savings increase the national 
saving ratio. This in turn translates into a higher investment rate in the economy at large. 
Furthermore, wealthier shareholders spend more, which promotes growth in production and 
consequently yield higher tax revenue for the state (through, for instance, VAT tax on 
increased spending). 
Extensive research on the benefits to shareholders in LBO transactions has shown that 
in the 1980￿s in the US shareholders in companies taken over in LBOs recorded returns of 
between 27.0 and 56.0 per cent above the average expected return in shares of the given risk
29. 
According to results of other research done by M.C. Jensen, average premium for 
shareholders of American companies in the 1980￿s ranged from 40% to 56% per annum
30. 
These results confirm the extraordinary returns of shareholders in leveraged buyouts. 
Likewise, leveraged buyouts bring substantial returns to LBO investors. The average 
ROI of the LBO fund KKR, in the period of nine years in the 1980￿s, amounted to 47 per cent 
annually
31. Most existing LBO funds produce annual returns exceeding 20 per cent annually. 
Those significant returns are brought about thanks to the increased value of the leveraged 
companies. The increase in value of the leveraged companies comes through generation of 
larger cash flows, sale of redundant assets, decrease in cost base and better management, 
which all finally show up in increased efficiency (ROE) of the LBO companies.  According to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
c)  The calculations assumed no growth in cash generation after 2006 ￿ this is clearly very conservative. Residual value of 
the company might be then much higher, 
d)  There is no tax on capital gains on sale of shares by individuals in the Polish market ￿ hence, if the company was bought 
by an individual, rather than a company, the 28% tax rate on the gain would not apply. 
29 Called CAR  - Cumulative Average Residuals. Wrzesiński, M. (2000). ￿Fuzje i przejęcia...￿, op.cit., p. 44, based on various 
authors. 
30 Jensen. M.C., ￿Eclipse of the Public Corporation￿, Harvard Business Review, September-October 1989, p.69. 
31 Lewandowski, M. (2001). M. Lewandowski ￿Przejęcia i fuzje w Polsce na tle tendencji światowych￿, WIG Press, p. 103.  
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M. Jensen, average annual ROI for LBO funds between 1979-1985 with assets of more than 
USD 50 million mounted to 125%!
32 And American LBO fund managed by Leon Plack boasts 
of 41% ROI per annum
33; Charterhouse Development Capital, a European LBO fund, in the 










Figure 8. Return on investment in LBOs: 
Source: Khoylian, R. (1988). ￿Venture Capital Performance￿, Needham, MA, Venture Economics, 
Inc., p. 9, after Wrzesiński, M. (2000). ￿Fuzje i przejęcia...￿, op.cit., p. 49. 
 
Higher ROE of companies directly impacts the economy: should all companies in a 
country increase their ROE, the whole economy would react by a decrease in unemployment, 
higher productivity, and faster economic growth. Increase in the economy-wide efficiency is 
also achieved through improvement in corporate governance, which results in a decrease in 
the agency costs, that is, costs of conflicts of interestes between incumbent management and 
the shareholders. According to M. Jensen
35 between 1977 and 1988 the average premium 
in LBO transactions amounted to 50 per cent - this is how much value of purchased 
companies was lost by incumbent management teams. Despite this large premium, LBO 
investors nonetheless made sufficient returns on their investments. Furthermore, according 
to Jensen all LBOs in the analyzed period generated total value of USD 500 billion, more 
than 50 per cent more than all dividends paid by those corporations in that period!    
Since most pre-LBO management teams are remunerated on the basis of the size of the 
company (explicitly ￿ based on the revenue or profits, or implicitly ￿ the bigger the company, 
                                                           
32 Jensen, M.C. ￿Eclipse of the Public Corporation￿, op.cit., p. 69. 
33 ￿The cutting edge of venture capital￿, Euromoney, July 1998. 
34 Ibidem. 
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the bigger the pay), they have a strong incentive to engage in ￿empire building￿ strategies, 
irrelevant of their economic sense. This ￿empire building￿ syndrome is confirmed by again M. 
Jensen ￿ in 1988 one thousand of the largest American companies paid out only USD 108 
billion in dividends and a further USD 51 million in share buybacks out of a total of USD 
1,600 billion of net profits. Clearly, management teams, unless forced by strict ownership 
control, have not incentive to return cash back to the shareholders. This is because 
dividend payouts decrease the size of the company and thus limit the power and remuneration 
of the management
36. In consequence of the ￿empire building￿ syndrome, the allocation of 
capital suffers. LBO transactions, however, remedy agency problems through close ownership 
supervision and improved management incentive strategies based on cash flow generation and 
ROE. 
Leveraged buyouts also redirect capital from mature industries with bleak growth 
prospects into projects with much more attractive expected returns. This is achieved through 
replacement of equity capital in leveraged companies with bank debt. As opposed to equity 
capital, amount of available debt is only limited by the size of the capital base of the 
financial system. Banks, thanks to the monetary multiplication effect, can create additional 
liquidity without a need to increase the underlying capital base ￿ available amount of debt is 
then only constrained by banks￿ capital adequacy ratios. Hence, replacement of equity with 
debt contributes to a more efficient allocation of existing scarce equity (amount of equity 
capital, ceteris paribus, increases roughly in step with an increase in national income ￿ GDP).  
Replacement of scarce equity ￿shackled￿ in declining industries with a virtually 
unlimited supply of debt and its subsequent investment into, for instance, high-value added 
information and communication technologies, where the high risk involved would not allow 
for the use of debt, may clearly contribute to the acceleration of economic growth. 
  The 1980￿s LBO boom in the U.S. has resulted in extensive economic research on the 
economic and social implications of LBO transactions. A number of studies were carried out, 
which analyzed the impact of LBOs on operating cash flow generation, taxes, value of 
investment in fixed assets and R&D, and finally LBOs impact on employment. Table X sums 
up the results of various research done in the US in the 1980￿s:  
 
Table 7. Economic implications of leveraged buyouts: 
  Opler  Kaplan  Kaplan 
and Stein








16.5 11.9 12.1 55.0  9.0  23.5    21.3 
Taxes  -89.1     -43.0%       -66.1 
Investment to 
revenue 
-42.2 -31.6        -11.4  -31.5  -29.2 
No. of 
Employees 
0,3 0.9        0.6  2.0  0.7 
R&D outlays  -7.2             -7.2 
Period 
analyzed 
1985-89 1980-86 1980-89 1980-87  1981-87  1976-87  1977-
86 
 
Cases analyzed  42 37 66  110 198  35  37  
Source: Opler, T. ￿Operating performance in leveraged buyouts. Evidence from 1985-1989￿, 
Financial Management 1992, p. 37-41, after Wrzesiński, M. (2000). ￿Fuzje i przejęcia...￿, 
op.cit., p. 51. 
                                                           
36 Jensen, M.C. ￿Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers￿, American Economic Review, May 
1986, p. 323.  
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All the studies clearly show that LBOs had very positive impact on cash generation. 
This is due to the aggregate impact of higher operating efficiency and asset re-allocation. 
From the point of view of the shareholder value, cash generation, next to ROE (although the 
two are not comparable ￿ the former is based on real, economic value, the latter reflects 
accounting results), is the most important driver of the value of the company (as in DCF 
valuation). Hence, an increased cash generation is the most important reflection of increase in 
shareholder value. 
  Interestingly and counterintuitively, the research also showed that LBOs had no impact 
on the level of employment. It seems that most post-LBO companies were not firing people ￿ 
instead they focused on moving the workforce away from administration and back-office into 
marketing and production. 
  The observed decrease in tax payments has ambivalent implications. On one side 
smaller tax payments increase cash generation, which in turn enhance the shareholder value. 
On the other hand, though, lower tax payments mean smaller revenue for the state. One may 
argue which is better. Yet, even if it is true that the State is losing on lower income tax 
payments of post-LBO companies (because of the debt-driven tax shield), one can however 
strongly argue that in the long run the higher efficiency of post-LBO companies will more 
than make up for the lost tax. This would be due to higher VAT tax revenue on increased 
sales, tax on dividend payouts, and capital gain tax revenue paid on share purchases and sales. 
In addition, debt interests paid by leveraged companies are considered to be a source of 
revenue for financial institutions, on which they pay tax, too. According to research by M. C. 
Jensen and S. Kaplan, LBO transactions in the U.S. in the 1980￿s, instead of decreasing tax 
revenue it increased it by 60%!
37 
   The results of the studies also pinpoint the negative side of performance of post-LBO 
companies: decrease in investment in fixed assets and R&D. At first glance this seems to be 
very worrying: lower capital expenditure and R&D outlays may contribute to long-run loss of 
competitiveness. Yet, this does not have to be always true: if companies were spending so 
much on investments before the LBO, why then was their performance (ROE) so miserable? 
Perhaps then those investments were not earning the required return on capital. If this is true, 
then lower investments may increase rather than decrease the long-run competitiveness. For 
sure, though, a cut in low-return investments increases shareholder value. 
Likewise results as given in the table were also obtained by M. C. Jensen. In his 
research he found out that companies taken over in LBO transactions increase their operating 
efficiency without significant cuts in the workforce and R&D outlays. Furthermore, during the 
first three years following the LBO, companies were able to increase operating profits by on 
average 42% annually. In the same period annual cash flows had increased by 96%
38. 
Finally, according to research done by Steven Kaplan, companies involved in LBOs in 
the U.S. in the 1981-86 period ￿had significantly (about 14 per cent) higher rates of 
productivity growth than other companies in the same industry (...). Among MBOs ￿ the 
subset of LBOs in which the acquirer includes the managers of the acquired unit ￿ the 
productivity growth differential was even larger ￿ about 20 per cent￿
39. And further on the 
employment in LBO, he argues that ￿LBOs appear to be production-labor-using, non-
                                                           
37 Smith, A. ￿Effects of Leveraged Buyouts Transactions￿, 4/1990, Business Economics, p. 20 
38 Jensen, M.C. ￿Eclipse of the Public Corporation￿, Harvard Business Review, September-October 1989, p. 69 
39 Kaplan, S. ￿The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts￿, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
3653, March 1991, p. 32, available at www.nber.org  
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production-labor-saving, organizational innovations￿
40. Thus, LBO organizations tend to cut 
costs of administration overheads, but there are no cuts in the number of production workers. 
  Higher risk of bankruptcy of the leveraged companies is nonetheless a real concern. 
According to Jensen, leveraged companies are more likely to experience financial difficulties 
than non-leveraged companies. However, only a few leveraged companies finally go bust. 
Thanks to concentrated ownership, companies in financial distress are quickly and 
successfully restructured; the improvement in financial health and prevention of bankruptcy is 
achieved at much lower cost than with non-leveraged companies
41. Nonetheless, higher risk of 




Economic implications of leveraged buyouts in Poland 
Leveraged buyouts in Poland and per proxy in other post-socialist countries can bring 
even higher benefits to shareholders, investors and the economy than in developed countries. 
This is due to the prevailing in post-socialist countries low quality of corporate governance, 
insufficient use of the financial leverage, low operating margins, and inadequate utilization of 
assets. All those shortcomings result in insufficient return on assets and equity and ensuing 
destruction of the shareholders￿ value. 
The case of study of the Mint provides a useful illustration of the potential of the 
leveraged buyout transactions for rapid restructuring of the economy and corresponding 
increase in economic efficiency. 
The Mint￿s ROE in the last three years (1998-2000) ranged between 3.3 and 14.8% per 
cent in nominal terms. Assuming that the company’s ROE in real terms in those three 
years should have been equal to American S&P 500 average of 21.3%
42 (Mint￿s nominal 
ROE would then have to equal roughly 26.0% to compensate for differences in inflation rates 
in Poland and the U.S.), the company would have produced roughly PLN 100 million of 
additional value to shareholders! But it has not. Due to wrong management of the financial 
structure of the company, which resulted in extremely low leverage, the company has 
destroyed an amazing value to its shareholders and consequently to the whole economy and 
society. 
Projecting forward, the wealth produced for shareholders (30% premium over 
prevailing share price) and investors (a dazzling 117% ROI) in the case of the LBO of Mint 
reflects the magnitude of the value, which would be compromised by the company if it 
maintained its current performance. In other words, the extraordinary ROI is a measure of how 
much value has been locked in the company. If the company were not going to change its 
performance, all of this value would be lost. 
In the table below the author projected two scenarios for performance of Mint in the 
2001-2006 period: (a) sustaining status quo and (b) post-LBO performance
 43.  
 
Table 8. Two scenarios for projected financial results of Mint in 2001-2006: 
  Ratio    2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
                                                           
40 Ibidem, p. 34 
41 Jensen, M.C., ￿Eclipse of the Public Corporation￿, op.cit., p. 63 
42 Data on S&P 500 ROI average in 2000 available at  www.morningstar.com 
43 Assumptions: increase in debt leverage, no change in operating performance. For detailed assumptions see 
Appendix 1.  
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Status quo  10.7% 11.3% 11.9% 12.5% 12.7% 12.8%  Efficiency ROE 
Post-LBO  6.6%  15.1% 20.1% 25.9% 31.8% 38.3% 
Status quo  78.0% 79.0% 80.0% 81.0% 82.0% 83.0%  Leverage Equity-to-
total assets  Post-LBO  33.0% 33.0% 33.0% 33.0% 33.0% 33.0% 
Status quo  5129% 5899% 6783% 7801% 8971%  10317%  Ability to 
service debt 
Interest 
coverage  Post-LBO  170.0% 197.0% 228.0% 265.0% 309.0% 360.0% 
 
In the projected period, post-LBO company would have increased ROE from 14.6 per 
cent in 2000 to 38.3 per cent in 2006 versus status quo result of 12.8% ROE only. Throughout 
the whole post-LBO period, in spite of substantially higher leverage, the company would have 
no difficulty with servicing debt. Most importantly, during the five-year period the post-
LBO Mint would have returned to shareholders an aggregate value (in dividend 
payments) of some PLN 140 million versus zero in the status quo scenario! The LBO of 
Mint would have not only substantially increase the company￿s efficiency ￿ the buyout would 
also have freed substantial capital, which when returned to shareholders could be used for 
financing companies in emerging industries.  
 
The example of insufficient performance of Mint holds true for the major part of 
the Polish economy. In 2000 the median ROE of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE) equaled meager 4.99%
44 in nominal terms. In real terms, after having 
calculated for an inflation rate of 8.6% in 2000, most of the Polish public companies had 
a negative return on their equity! Hundreds of million of dollars of shareholders’ value 
has been thus destroyed!  
Companies listed on the WSE are by far the blue chips of the Polish economy ￿ only 
the best companies are able to enter the stockmarket. Since those companies are supposed to 
be better than not listed companies, one could then safely assume that ROE￿s of non-listed 
companies are still lower than WSE￿s companies. How much more value have they 
destroyed? 
As proved above, leveraged buyouts can significantly improve performance of 
companies. Should LBO transaction be then promoted as a way to restructure companies, the 
implications for the economy could be indeed extraordinary! 
Of course, not every company can be purchased in a LBO ￿ as said before a suitable 
target company needs to generate large free cash flows, require only little capital investment, 
and holds surplus cash. Under an assumption that 5 per cent of the Polish companies (in 
terms of equity capital as a share in total GDP) would qualify for an LBO and after 
restructuring would be subsequently able to increase their ROE from current 4.99 per 
cent to the level of S&P 500 average, post-LBO companies would have generated an 
additional value of USD 2,035 million or a whole 1.2 per cent of the Polish GDP in 
2000!
45 
The increase in ROE can be achieved through an increase in operating efficiency, 
higher leverage and re-allocation of assets. Restructuring of the Poland￿s economy requires 
improvement in all three aspects.  
Next to the low operating efficiency, financial structure of the Polish companies, 
which exhibits a very low use of debt, needs a lot of improvement in order to increase ROE to 
the levels recorded in the developed countries. According to data, average leverage (debt to 
                                                           
44 Own calculations based on Onet Supertabela available at www.onet.pl 
45 Calculations: 23.6% difference in ROE multiplied by GDP in 2000 of USD 172.5 billion and 5%.  
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equity capital) of Polish companies in the 1993-97 period amounted to only 31 per cent versus 
84 per cent on average in developed countries
46. 
Replacement of equity with debt, assuming that the leverage of the Polish 
companies could be increased to the average level of the developed countries, would 
release equity capital to the tune of USD 8.5 billion dollars
47, this is some 4.9 per cent of 
GDP in 2000. The released capital would finance the much needed high-risk 
investments, which can not be financed by debt.  
There is a lot of available debt in the Polish market. Polish banks are significantly 
overliquid as shown by high capital adequacy ratios, which averaged 14.6 per cent in 2000. 
The current low use of debt in the Polish economy hovering around 40.0 per cent of GDP, as 
opposed to, for instance, the U.S. where the total debt to GDP ratio amounted to 181 per cent 
in 2000
48, leaves a lot of room for debt expansion. 
Consequently, apart from a role in restructuring the economy, leveraged buyouts 
would also play the important role of an intermediary between low leveraged companies and 
overliquid banks. 
  Despite some risks, leveraged buyouts can clearly play a very important in the 
restructuring of the Polish economy. Since there were no LBO transactions in Poland, of 
course no research could have been carried out on the effects of leveraged buyouts. Yet, one 
may safely assume that results in Poland would be at least as good as those in the US. Low 
efficiency of Polish economy leaves much more space for improvement.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Leveraged buyouts can substantially increase return on equity (ROE) of the purchased 
companies through increase in operating efficiency, higher debt leverage and better allocation 
of assets. The increase in operating efficiency is achieved through closer ownership control, 
reduction in conflict of interests between management and shareholders (agency cost), salary 
incentive programs based on the company￿s performance, and finally cost cutting. Higher debt 
leverage results in increased free cash flow generation due to the tax shield effect of tax 
deductible debt interests. Sale of non-core and redundant assets contributes to the increase in 
returns on existing assets.  
The substantial improvements in performance of entreprises taken over in LBO 
transactions contribute to the extraordinary benefits accruing to both pre-LBO shareholders 
and LBO investors.  
  The case study of a hypothetical leveraged buyout of Mint, a Polish public company 
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, highlights the extraordinary returns available to 
existing shareholders as well as buyout investors. The analyzed transaction resulted in 30% 
increase in Mint￿s share price to the pre-LBO shareholders. Under an assumption that after the 
LBO Mint could be re-sold at a price equal to its valuation, and that the debt leverage in the 
buyout would equal 3.3 to 1, the LBO investors would stand to achieve returns on their 
invested capital to the tune of a dazzling 117 per cent! This proves the viability of debt-driven 
buyouts versus alternative of own equity financing. 
The case study also analyzed the whole process of a leveraged transaction. The step-
by-step analysis proves that the Polish market is mature enough for a successful introduction 
of leveraged buyouts.  
                                                           
46 Wrzesiński, M. (2000). ￿Fuzje i przejęcia...￿, op. cit.,  p. 148-149 
47 Ibidem, p. 159 based on data for 1997. 
48 Rzeczpospolita, December 11, 2000, based on data of the Moody￿s Investors Services for the III quarter of 
2000.   
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Finally, the case study speculated on the size of shareholder value destroyed due to the 
insufficient use of leverage. It transpired that Mint during the last couple of years have 
destroyed substantial value to the shareholders. Should the status quo continue in the future, 
the company is likely to compromise still larger value. 
It was shown that debt leverage of Polish companies is much lower than in developed 
countries. The insufficient leverage results in lower-than-otherwise possible ROE. There is 
plenty of available debt financing, which could contribute to the increase in economy-wide 
leverage. Polish financial sector is significantly overliquid ￿ low sophistication and risk 
aversion of local banks coupled with high interests rates have contributed to the very low 
utilization of the banks￿ balance sheets as illustrated by an average capital adequacy ratio of 
14.6 per cent in 2000, considerably higher than the recommended 8 per cent ratio. Leveraged 
buyouts could then stimulate the higher use of debt leverage to the benefit of both the 
companies and the financial sector. 
Microeconomic improvements conditioned by the leveraged buyouts translate into 
large benefits to the whole economy. On macroeconomic level leveraged buyouts contribute 
to better allocation of capital and higher efficiency of the economy.  
Leveraged buyouts through replacement of equity capital of leveraged companies with 
debt contribute to freeing scarce equity capital away from mature, low-value added industries 
into high-risk, high-value added industries, which could not be otherwise financed with debt. 
  The paper showed that there is enough of supply of target companies for leveraged 
buyouts in Poland. LBO financing sources are also available. It seems that only lack of LBO 
investors limits the development of the leveraged buyout market.  
Leveraged buyouts can be successfully used in post-socialist countries as a potent tool 
for acceleration of the economic restructuring. Since efficiency of companies in post-socialist 
countries as measured by ROE is much lower than in the developed countries, leveraged 
buyouts offer higher potential benefits to the post-socialist countries than to the developed 
countries. For the lack of any major LBO market activity any analysis of its economic effects 
is premature. Peer pressure ￿ actual LBO transactions will also have a side effect on other 
companies, which in fear of being themselves purchased in LBO transaction, would 
restructure themselves with a view to increasing 
Leveraged transactions could not be used for restructuring of all companies. Only 
those companies with large cash flows, surplus assets, low leverage and little investment 
needs qualify. In short, LBOs are best for companies in mature industries with slow growth 
prospects. LBOs may not be then favorable to high-growth industries with large investment 
needs, where more long-term management can bring more benefits
49. 
LBOs can also benefit the economy through the impact of a peer pressure. Inefficient 
companies will have a strong incentive to restructure themselves in the face of the threat of a 
their buyout. Thus even small LBO activity can have large spillover effects on the other parts 
of the economy.  
Leveraged buyouts should be then promoted as a restructuring tool for the Polish 
economy. Economic policies should emphasize fast development of capital markets, which 
contribute to the growth in the market for corporate control. Specifically, the accelerated 
development of the Warsaw Stock Exchange should be supported ￿ for instance in the form of 
creation of a pan-European stockmarket alliance, which would expose Polish companies to the 
European capital markets. The stockmarket alliance would be much more attractive to 
companies since it would offer larger financing pools and recognition. Larger stockmarket 
                                                           
49 Leuhrmann, T. and Kester C. (1996). ￿Rehabilitating the Leveraged Buyout￿. Harvard Business Review, No. 5-
6, p. 129  
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would provide higher supply of companies for buyouts, thus benefiting the LBO market. A 
pan-European stockmarket would provide a welcome exit for investment of LBO funds as 
well as venture capital and private equity funds. Easier exit from investments would 
contribute to faster development of high-risk investments. Finally, a large stockmarket would 
also increase share price transparency, which provides relevant economic information for free 
to the whole economy thus lowering transaction costs. 
  What are the prospects for the leveraged buyout market in Poland? There are strong 
signs that the LBO market will quickly develop in Poland. This will be due to the following 
factors: 
a) Increasing sophistication of financial and consulting institutions as confirmed by 
significant rate of growth of the local M&A market.  
b)  Increasing market competition for returns ￿ financial institutions in quest for higher 
margins and away from standard products will look for new transactions, including 
LBOs. 
c) Expanding base of financing sources ￿ overliquidity of the banking system and 
growing assets of pension funds will guarantee substantial financing even for higher 
risk transactions. Furthermore, ever-growing bond market will represent yet another 
potent source of LBO financing. 
d)  Decreasing market interest rates ￿ current horrendously high interest rates can only go 
down: it will result in a decrease of cost of debt, higher incentives for lenders to shift 
investments away from government bonds, and finally lower discount rates in 
valuations, which will in turn increase the NPV value of LBO target companies. 
e)  Pending integration with the EU coupled with globalization and growing market 
transparency due to information technologies will lower barriers of entry into the 
Polish capital market, which will subsequently stimulate development of the LBO 
market. 
 
The author of the paper hopes that this paper will contribute to the growth of the LBO 
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Projected financial results of Mint in 2001-2006 for two scenarios:  
(a) sustaining status quo, and  
(b) post-LBO performance. 
 
Assumptions: 
•  Annual growth in revenue - 15% (versus 37.8% in nominal terms in 2000, approximtely 
29.2% in real terms) 
•  Operating margin - 15% (versus 20.2% in 2000) 
•  Tax rate ￿ decreasing from 28% in 2001 to 22% in 2006 (28% in 2002, 24% in 2003, 22% 
in 2004, 2005, 2006) 
•  Cost of debt ￿ 13.4% over the period (based on quotes on 5-year IRS swap transaction as 
of 31.05.2001)  
•  Increase in assets ￿ equal to increase in working capital, which would be equal to 10% of 
increase in annual sales. Investment in fixed assets to equal annual depreciation. 
•  All projections based on prices in real terms. 
 
a)  
•  Debt leverage ￿ we will assume that throughout the whole period the company will 
maintain its interest-bearing debt at the level of current PLN 5,000 thousand
50  
•  Increase in equity ￿ no dividends paid - equal to annual net income. 
 
b)  
•  Debt leverage ￿ equity to assets ratio equal to 0,33 throughout the whole period.  
•  Increase in equity - all net income paid out in dividends ￿ equity to assets to always equal 
0,33. 
•  Non-interest bearing debt ￿ to increase from 2000 level by an amount equal to 10% of 
annual increase in revenue. In 2001 decrease in equity would result from extraordinary 
divident payout or share buyback. The freed equity would be replaced with interest-
bearing debt 





Valuation of Mint: 
 
a)  Net Asset Value menthod: 
Book value of the company is equal to a difference between the value of the company￿s assets 
and its total liabilities. On December 31, 2000, Mint￿s total book value amounted to PLN 
215,446 thousand, 22.5% more than current market capitalization. 
 
b)  Simplified valuation based on the compnay￿s ability to service debt: 
Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) for Mint in 2000 accounting year amounted to PLN 
47,865. Apllying minimum ratio of debt interest coverage of 1,5 (EBIT to debt interests), Mint 
is capable of paying PLN 31,910 thousand of debt interests annually. Assuming current cost of 
debt in PLN at the level of 13.4% p.a. (5-year fixed rate loan with bullet payment), the 
company could incur debt in the total amount of PLN 238,134 thousand. For the purpose of 
the LBO, at the leverage ratio of 3,3:1, Mint would be worth PLN 785,842 thousand. 
Deducting value of outstanding debt, the enterprise value to shareholders would amount to 
PLN 693,390 thousand. 
 
c) DCF  method: 
The value of the company is a sum of: 
+  discounted projected free cash flows (NPV) 
+  present value of residual value (RV) 
+ non-operating  assets 
_ non-operatring  liabilities 
 
= Value of the company 
 
Calculation of NPV and RV 
1.   Projection of free cash flow 
 
Table 9. Projected free cash flows for Mennica in 2001-2006 (in PLN thousand): 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Total revenue  229 108  263 474  302 995  348 444  400 711  460 817 
Operating profit  34 366  39 521  45 449  52 267  60 107  69 123 
 - Tax  9 623  10 275  10 908  11 499  13 223  15 207 
+ Depreciation  9 000  9 000  9 000  9 000  9 000  9 000 
 - Increase in working capital  2 988  3 437  3 952  4 545  5 227  6 011 
 - Capital expenditures  9 000  9 000  9 000  9 000  9 000  9 000 
Free cash flow  21 755  25 809  30 589  36 223  41 656  47 905 
Assumptions: the same as in Appendix 1 
 
2.   Discount rate: 
 
WACC = k(e) * E/A + k(d) (1-t) * D/A      






k(e)  ￿  cost of equity (see calculation below) 
k(d)  ￿  cost of debt before tax - estimated for 2001-2006 at 13,4% per annum (based on 
current 5-year swap transactions). Average inflation in 2001-2006 period - 4%. Debt interests 
in real terms will then amount to 9,4% per annum
51 
t ￿ average tax rate in 2001-2006 estimated at 24% 
E/A ￿ market value of equity to total market value of assets - after LBO projected weight at 
0,5 
D/A ￿ market value of debt to market value of total assets ￿ after LBO projected weight at 0,5 
 
K(e) =  R(f) + β  leveraged (R(m) ￿ R(f))            
K(e)  = 8,9% + 1,17 * (18,9% - 8,3%) = 21,3% 
 
where, 
K(e)  ￿ cost of equity 
R(f) ￿ current nominal interest in 52-week Treasury bills equal to 15,5%; in real terms at a 
current 6,6 % inflation, real interest rate amounts to 8,3% per annum. 
R(m) ￿ average return on the stockmarket ￿ in light of the lack of stattistically viable 
measurement of returns on the the WIG index resulting from short 9-year history and high 
volatility, we will assume the risk premium over the risk-free asset to equal to 10%, almost 
4% higher than risk premium for the US market of 6,05%
52. Hence, the expected return on the 
stockmarket will equal 18,9% (risk-free rate plus the 10% risk premium) 
β  leveraged ￿ 1,17
53 (calculation see below) 
 
3.  
Table 10. Mint￿s non-operating assets and liabilities as of 31.12.2000 (in PLN thousand): 
(+) Value of non operating assets  125,022 
          - Office Business Center Aurum  65,000 
          - Long-term investments in subsidiaries   40,813 
          - Cash and marketable securities  19,309 
          - Loan to the SPV  87,100 
(-) Value of non-operating liabilities  92,452 
          - Increase in debt  87,100 
          - Debt  5,352* 





                                                           
51 Real interest rate =  (nominal rate ￿ inflation rate)/(1 + inflation rate) 
52 For the U.S. market premium see www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar 
53 β  unleveraged = β  unleveraged  *  [(Equity+Debt)/Equity]      
β  leveraged = 0,39 * [(94,828+ 189,656)/94,828] = 1,17 
 
where, 
β  unleveraged ￿ 0,39 for the Mint as per Internet service of Reuters 3000. 
Equity ￿ projected value of equity after LBO 




4.  Total value of the company for various discount rates 
 
Figure 9. Total value of Mint for various discount rates: 
















ROI calculation:  
Io
Io D S X DCF t X DCF
R
− − − −
=
)}] % * ( * { %) * [(
 
where, 
R = ROI in % 
DCF ￿ value of the company as per its DCF valuation 
Io ￿  buyer￿s own capital 
t ￿ capital gain tax in % 
S ￿  original purchase price for the shares 
X % - share of the buyer in total financing (one-third of total in this exercise) 
D ￿ value of the debt due by the SPV to Mint. 
 
Assumptions: 28% tax on capital gains, transaction costs not included due to their marginal 
value (brokerage commission, costs of the public tender offer, costs of the bridge financing), 
12 months projected deadline for sale ￿ otherwise, the proceeds from the sale should be 
discounted to its Net Present Value (NPV). 
 